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HOLDING BLACKWATER ACCOUNTABLE: 
PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS AND 
THE PROTECTIONS OF USE IMMUNITY 
Emily Kelly* 
Abstract: Private security contractors who commit crimes abroad enjoy 
extensive protection from prosecution. When private security contractors 
discharge weapons without authorization, the U.S. State Department im-
mediately compels them to make official statements regarding the inci-
dents. The statements are made under the threat of job loss, but are sub-
sequently protected by immunity. The U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia’s dismissal of United States v. Slough highlights the difficulties 
prosecutors face in obtaining untainted evidence as a result of these pro-
tected statements. The Department of Justice has no control over grants 
of immunity to private security contractors and they face substantial ob-
stacles in obtaining independent untainted evidence in war zones. As a 
result, prosecutors in Slough could not gather sufficient untainted evi-
dence to hold employees of the private security firm Blackwater responsi-
ble for the homicide of fourteen Iraqi civilians. This Comment suggests 
the State Department should adopt procedural changes to avoid future 
challenges associated with compelled statements and allow successful 
prosecutions of private security contractors. 
Introduction 
 On December 31, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia dismissed manslaughter charges against five security guards 
formerly employed by Blackwater Security Consulting1 in United States v. 
Slough.2 The charges stemmed from a September 16, 2007 shooting in 
Baghdad, Iraq that left fourteen Iraqi citizens dead and twenty injured.3 
In his ninety-page opinion, Judge Ricardo M. Urbina scolded Depart-
                                                                                                                      
* Emily Kelly is the Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & 
Comparative Law Review. 
1 Dana Hedgpeth, Blackwater Sheds Name, Shifts Focus, Wash. Post, Feb. 14, 2009, at D1. 
Blackwater has since changed its name to “Xe” in an effort to rebrand after their image 
was tarnished in the September 2007 shootings. Id. 
2 677 F. Supp. 2d 112, 116 (D.D.C. 2009) (Slough I ). 
3 Id.; Press Release, Department of Justice, Transcript of Blackwater Press Conference 
(Dec. 8, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-nsd-1070.html. 
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ment of Justice (DOJ) prosecutors for misusing statements that State 
Department investigators coerced from the defendants under the 
threat of job loss.4 Judge Urbina’s recognition of the extensive legal 
protection for compelled statements underscores the difficulties in ob-
taining admissible evidence against private security contractors who 
commit crimes in war zones.5 
 The dismissal also placed further strain on relations between the 
United States and Iraq, sparking outrage from the victims and their 
families, and cementing Iraqi distrust of the democratic principles em-
bodied in the American judicial system.6 On April 22, 2011, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reignited the con-
troversy when it issued a decision correcting the District Court’s inter-
pretation of the law and remanding the case for further examination.7 
 Part I of this Comment provides background information about 
the shooting, subsequent investigation, and prosecution of the Blackwa-
ter guards. This Part also presents an overview of the district court and 
appellate court decisions. Part II focuses on the jurisprudence of com-
pelled statements in Garrity v. New Jersey and Kastigar v. United States, and 
the judicial protections it provides. Part II considers the evidentiary 
challenges associated with the common application of Garrity and Kasti-
gar to cases of police misconduct. Part III analyzes in more detail the 
practice of eliciting compelled statements from private security contrac-
tors working in war zones. In particular, this Part highlights the difficulty 
prosecutors face in building a successful case against security contractors 
who have provided immunized statements. 
I. Background 
A. The Events in Nisur Square and Protected Statements 
 On September 16, 2007, a car bomb exploded near a Baghdad 
compound where a U.S. diplomat was meeting with Iraqi officials.8 A 
Blackwater Tactical Support Team, comprised of the five defendants 
and fourteen other Blackwater contractors, was dispatched to assist with 
                                                                                                                      
4 See Slough I, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 115. 
5 See id. at 130; DonnaMarie McKinnon, Federal Civilian Criminal Prosecutions of Private 
Military Contractors: Inherent Legal Ethics Issues, 24 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 695, 702 (2011). 
6 See Timothy Williams, Iraqis Angered at Dropping of Blackwater Charges, N.Y. Times, Jan. 
2, 2010, at A4. 
7 See United States v. Slough (Slough II ), 641 F.3d 544, 547 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
8 Slough II, 641 F.3d 544, 547 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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the diplomat’s evacuation.9 Although the nature of their mission was 
defensive, the defendants opened fire shortly after entering the Nisur 
Square traffic circle, killing fourteen unarmed civilians and wounding 
at least twenty others.10 In response to the shooting, Iraq’s Interior Min-
ister ordered all Blackwater employees to leave the country immedi-
ately, citing the Nisur shooting as the final straw in a series of fatal inci-
dents involving Iraqi citizens and foreign government contractors.11 
 State Department procedures required that all Blackwater employ-
ees involved in any shooting incident submit to an immediate debriefing 
by the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Services (DSS).12 The 
procedures also required that any employee who discharged a weapon 
prepare a written statement on a template provided by the State De-
partment.13 The template included a provision known as a “Garrity warn-
ing” that required the employee to make a statement or face termina-
tion, but provided that any statement so made could not be used against 
the employee in a criminal proceeding.14 The defendants completed 
their interviews with DSS investigators hours after the shooting and 
submitted their written statements on September 18, 2007.15 In their 
interviews and written statements, the defendants maintained that they 
had opened fire in response to an insurgent attack.16 The shooting and 
subsequent investigation attracted global media attention, and portions 
of the defendants’ interviews and written statements began to appear in 
news reports.17 
 At the direction of the State Department, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) launched an investigation in Baghdad and uncov-
ered evidence showing that the defendants had fired their weapons at 
the crowd of civilians without provocation.18 When the government first 
presented the case to a grand jury in November 2007, key witnesses 
admitted to reading news reports featuring content from the defen-
                                                                                                                      
9 See id. at 548; Press Release, Department of Justice, supra note 3. 
10 See Press Release, Department of Justice, supra note 3. 
11 See Joshua Partlow & Walter Pincus, Iraq Bans Security Contractor; Blackwater Faulted in 
Killings, Wash. Post, Sept. 18, 2007, at A1. 
12 United States v. Slough (Slough I ), 677 F. Supp. 2d 112, 118 (D.D.C. 2009). 
13 Id. 
14 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967); Slough I, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 119. 
15 Slough I, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 119. 
16 See id. at 117–18. 
17 See, e.g., Sudarsan Raghavan & Karen DeYoung, 5 Witnesses Insist Iraqis Didn’t Fire on 
Guards; State Dept. to Study System for Security, Wash. Post, Sept. 29, 2007, at A1. 
18 See James Glanz, New Evidence that Blackwater Guards Took No Fire, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 
2007, at A1; Press Release, Department of Justice, supra note 3. 
20 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 35: E. Supp. 
dants’ compelled statements, raising concern about tainted evidence.19 
The government decided to re-present the case to a second grand jury 
in November 2008, providing redacted transcripts of testimony from 
the first grand jury without reference to information derived from the 
defendants’ compelled statements.20 The second grand jury delivered a 
thirty-five-count indictment against the defendants on December 8, 
2008.21 
B. United States v. Slough: Kastigar Hearing and Dismissal 
 In May 2009, the government filed a “Motion for a Garrity Hearing 
in Lieu of a Pretrial Kastigar Hearing,” and argued that the defendants’ 
statements to DSS investigators should not be treated as immunized 
statements under the standards of analysis laid out in Kastigar v. United 
States.22 When cases involve immunized statements, Kastigar requires 
courts to hold a hearing for parties to prove proper evidentiary use of 
those statements.23 By filing this motion, the government attempted to 
avoid needing to prove proper use of the defendants’ statements to 
DSS investigators in a Kastigar hearing.24 
 The District Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion 
on the ground that there had not been adequate briefing on the legal 
and factual basis for the application of Kastigar.25 After extensive addi-
tional briefing from both sides, the court determined that the defen-
dants’ Garrity compelled statements were protected by both use and de-
rivative use immunity.26 The court held a Kastigar hearing on October 
14, 2009 to determine whether the government had impermissibly used 
any of the compelled statements.27 The government maintained it had 
effectively limited exposure to the compelled statements and any taint 
that may have occurred was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”28 
                                                                                                                      
19 See Slough I, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 126. 
20 See id. at 127. 
21 See id. at 128; Press Release, Department of Justice, supra note 3. 
22 Slough I, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 128–29; see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 
(1972). 
23 See Slough I, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 128–29. 
24 See id. 
25 Slough I, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 129. 
26 Id. Use immunity is “immunity from the use of the compelled testimony (or any in-
formation derived from that testimony) in a future prosecution against the witness. After 
granting use immunity, the government can still prosecute if it shows that its evidence comes 
from a legitimate independent source.” Black’s Law Dictionary 819 (9th ed. 2009). 
27 Slough I, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 129. 
28 Id. at 144. 
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 The district court disagreed with the government and found most 
of the evidence presented to the second grand jury had been tainted by 
exposure to the defendants’ protected statements.29 The court also de-
termined that the prosecutors’ exposure to the DSS interviews had im-
permissibly tainted the government’s decision to indict two of the de-
fendants.30 
 The government appealed the district court’s decision, and the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision on April 22, 2011 clari-
fying points of law and remanding the case for further review.31 The 
appellate court held that the lower court had failed to evaluate the 
presence of tainted evidence for each defendant individually.32 Fur-
thermore, the lower court failed to assess the existence of independent 
and untainted sources for the evidence, as required by Kastigar.33 For 
example, many of the objectionable news reports stemmed from state-
ments made by all nineteen Tactical Team members, and were not ex-
clusively based on the protected statements of the named defendants.34 
On remand, the district court will review the government’s evidence on 
an individual basis to track the use of tainted evidence against each de-
fendant.35 
II. Discussion 
A. The Historic Right Against Self-Incrimination 
1. The Extension of Immunity Under Garrity 
 Traditionally, federal prosecutors provide immunity from criminal 
prosecution to induce testimony from witnesses asserting their Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.36 In 1967, the Supreme 
Court broadened the application of federal immunity in Garrity v. New 
Jersey, holding that statements obtained under the threat of removal 
from office could not be used in subsequent criminal proceedings 
                                                                                                                      
29 See id. at 115–16. 
30 Id. 
31 See Slough II, 641 F.3d at 554–55. 
32 See id. 
33 Id. at 551. 
34 Id. 
35 See id. at 554–55. 
36 See Kate E. Bloch, Police Officers Accused of Crime: Prosecutorial and Fifth Amendment 
Risks Posed by Police-Elicited “Use Immunized” Statements, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 625, 626. 
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against the accused.37 In Garrity, two police officers were investigated 
for their involvement in a conspiracy to obstruct motor vehicle traffic 
laws by fixing traffic tickets.38 Before being questioned by the deputy 
district attorney, each defendant was warned that his statements could 
be used against him in a criminal proceeding and that he had the right 
to refuse to answer if the disclosure would incriminate him.39 The de-
fendants were also told, however, that refusal to answer any questions 
could result in their removal from office.40 
 The Supreme Court found the choice between self-incrimination 
and job loss impermissibly coercive, and held that the defendants had 
broad transactional immunity, effectively protecting them from any fu-
ture criminal prosecution.41 The defendants therefore received the 
same protection from criminal prosecution traditionally afforded to 
witnesses who were forced to give incriminating testimony.42 Garrity 
thus established that compelled statements are analogous to immu-
nized witness testimony.43 
2. Kastigar and Use Immunity 
 In 1972, the Supreme Court once again modified the application 
of federal immunity in Kastigar v. United States.44 Unlike Garrity, Kastigar 
concerned subpoenaed witnesses rather than statements made under 
threat of job loss, yet the outcome had a substantial impact on the sub-
sequent application of Garrity.45 The Kastigar defendants argued that 
they were entitled to complete transactional immunity46 from prosecu-
tion in exchange for their compelled testimony.47 The Court rejected 
the application of transactional immunity, holding that use and deriva-
                                                                                                                      
37 See 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967). 
38 See id. at 494. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 See id. at 497, 500. 
42 See id. 
43 See Steven Clymer, Compelled Statements from Police Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1309, 1312 (2001). 
44 See 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). 
45 Donald Wm. Driscoll, Garrity v. New Jersey and its Progeny: How Lower Courts are Weaken-
ing the Strong Constitutional Protections Afforded Police Officers, 22 Buff. Pub. Int. L.J. 101, 114 
(2004). 
46 See generally Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 26, at 819 (“Immunity from prose-
cution for any event or transaction described in the compelled testimony.”). 
47 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 443. 
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tive use immunity48 for compelled statements was sufficient because it 
served the purpose of leaving the witness and prosecutors in “substan-
tially the same position as if the witness had claimed the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege.”49 Additionally, the Court reaffirmed the extensive pro-
tections associated with immunity by clearly placing the burden on the 
prosecution to prove that it had properly used immune statements.50 
 In what is known as a “Kastigar hearing,” once a defendant shows 
that he testified under a grant of immunity, the prosecution must prove 
that the evidence it proposes to use stems from legitimate sources in-
dependent of the compelled testimony.51 This explanation of the pros-
ecutor’s burden clarified the standard that must be applied to state-
ments protected under Garrity.52 
3. Protection for Government Contractors 
 The Supreme Court addressed the Fifth Amendment protections 
of government contractors in Lefkowitz v. Turley.53 This 1973 case over-
turned a New York statute that required government contractors to ei-
ther waive immunity by answering questions regarding their work, or 
have their contracts canceled.54 
 The Court remarked that the State “intended to accomplish what 
Garrity specifically prohibited—to compel testimony that had not been 
immunized.”55 The State asserted that government contractors should 
not be afforded the protection of immunity because the threat of can-
celing government contracts is not as coercive as the threat of job loss 
to public employees.56 The Court disagreed, finding that a “significant 
infringement of constitutional rights” cannot be justified by specula-
tions about a contractor’s ability to find subsequent employment.57 Le-
fkowitz thus extended to government contractors the protections that 
Garrity and Kastigar provided for public employees who gave compelled 
statements.58 
                                                                                                                      
48 See generally Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 26, at 819 (defining “any informa-
tion derived from [compelled] testimony” as within the scope of use immunity). 
49 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462. 
50 See id. at 461–62. 
51 Id. at 460; see Bloch, supra note 36, at 645. 
52 See Bloch, supra note 36, at 645. 
53 414 U.S. 70, 83 (1973). 
54 Id. at 71. 
55 Id. at 82. 
56 See id. at 83. 
57 Id. at 84. 
58 See id. at 85. 
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B. Common Application of Garrity and Kastigar to Police Misconduct 
 Reviewing the common application of Garrity and Kastigar to cases 
of police misconduct highlights the new challenges raised in the con-
text of prosecuting private security contractors for crimes committed 
abroad.59 Most police departments have internal affairs procedures that 
impose penalties, including job loss, on employees who refuse to an-
swer questions during investigations.60 As a result, almost all criminal 
cases stemming from an internal police investigation require a Kastigar 
hearing to determine whether any compelled statement has tainted the 
prosecution’s evidence.61 This practice has elicited criticism from 
scholars who point to fundamental problems arising from the structure 
of police investigations.62 
 An initial challenge in preserving evidence is that investigators of-
ten take statements from officers immediately following an incident of 
misconduct, before a criminal investigation has been launched.63 At 
this stage, prosecutors have no involvement in the investigation, and 
therefore no control over the grant of immunity.64Consequently, prose-
cutors lose any opportunity to preserve the independence of evidence 
before they are even made aware of the misconduct.65 This situation 
comes in stark contrast to the traditional application of immunity, 
where the prosecutor first weighs the challenges of Garrity inadmissibil-
ity before deciding to grant immunity to a witness.66 
 Additionally, prosecutors faced with the choice of granting immu-
nity in exchange for compelled testimony have an opportunity before 
making that decision to preserve the independence from compelled 
statements of other evidence.67 This opportunity is often lost during a 
police misconduct investigation, when internal affairs investigators are 
free to make unimpeded use of compelled statements in the course of 
their investigation, often resulting in an almost inevitable witness con-
tamination.68 For example, during a police misconduct investigation, 
an investigator may read a compelled statement to a third party witness 
                                                                                                                      
59 See Clymer, supra note 43, at 1328–35; McKinnon, supra note 5, at 702. 
60 See Clymer, supra note 43, at 1312. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. at 1313. 
63 See id. at 1328–29. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. at 1331. 
66 See Clymer, supra note 43, at 1328. 
67 See id. at 1330. 
68 See Bloch, supra note 36, at 688. 
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in order to sort out inconsistencies and frame further questions.69 This 
practice eliminates potential witnesses before a formal criminal investi-
gation even begins.70 
 One final challenge in preserving the admissibility of testimony 
during a police misconduct investigation is that the grantor of immu-
nity is often a colleague of the officer being questioned.71 Some schol-
ars argue that this format essentially grants law enforcement officials 
the power to absolve their colleagues of criminal liability and under-
mines confidence in the integrity of the justice system.72 
C. The Prosecution’s Response: Methods for Avoiding Taint 
 In order to address the challenges presented by Garrity and Kasti-
gar, the DOJ has developed elaborate procedures to help prevent the 
impermissible tainting of evidence.73 In order to identify and limit ex-
posure to compelled statements, the prosecution usually designates a 
separate team of attorneys to sort through evidence before it reaches 
the trial team.74 This team screens all potential witnesses and only pass-
es along evidence to the trial team once it has determined that the Gar-
rity burden can be met.75 
   Yet staffing a separate team to screen witnesses requires signifi-
cant department resources, and the two-tiered process of reviewing evi-
dence slows investigation immensely.76 Moreover, this elaborate process 
does not always ensure that a case is free from taint.77 
III. Analysis 
A. Problems with the Garrity/Kastigar Burden in Cases Involving  
Private Security Contractors 
 The same evidentiary challenges that accompany immunized 
statements in prosecutions of police officers are even greater in prose-
cutions of private security contractors, because the DOJ has no control 
over grants of immunity and cannot gather sufficient independent evi-
                                                                                                                      
69 See id. at 637; Clymer, supra note 43, at 1333–34. 
70 See Bloch, supra note 36, at 637; Clymer, supra note 43, at 1333–34. 
71 See Bloch, supra note 36, at 677. 
72 See id.; Clymer, supra note 43, at 1334–35. 
73 See Clymer, supra note 43, at 1339–40. 
74 See Slough I, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 122; Clymer, supra note 43, at 1340. 
75 Clymer, supra note 43, at 1340. 
76 See id., at 1341. 
77 See Slough I, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 123; Clymer, supra note 43, at 1341. 
26 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 35: E. Supp. 
dence in war zones.78 Despite numerous allegations of serious criminal 
conduct by security contractors working in Iraq and Afghanistan, there 
has only been one successful prosecution of contractors for violence 
against local citizens, because most cases collapse from a lack of un-
tainted evidence.79 
 For example, in October of 2010, the DOJ announced it would not 
seek murder charges against Andrew Moonen, a Blackwater employee 
who killed one of the Iraqi vice president’s bodyguards in 2004.80 In the 
immediate aftermath of the shooting, Moonen gave a statement to U.S. 
Embassy officials after receiving a Garrity warning, triggering immunity 
protections and frustrating any opportunity for an independent DOJ 
investigation.81 Despite conducting a three-year investigation, the DOJ 
was unable to gather sufficient evidence to present a case that was in-
dependent of the immunized statement.82 
 The dismissal of charges in Slough I also illustrates the difficulty 
prosecutors face in building a successful case against security contrac-
tors while avoiding the spread of tainted evidence.83 Although Judge 
Urbina excoriated the government for failing to follow taint proce-
dures, the number of obstacles stemming from the defendants’ com-
pelled statements may have condemned any chance of successful pros-
ecution before the official criminal investigation even began.84 
 In addition to the technical challenges associated with immunity, 
criminal cases involving the actions of private security contractors are 
surrounded by immense political pressure and have serious implica-
tions for domestic and foreign relations.85 Failing to successfully prose-
cute contractors who commit crimes abroad erodes confidence in the 
integrity of the American justice system, and undermines foreign war 
efforts.86 
                                                                                                                      
78 See McKinnon, supra note 5, at 702. 
79 Human Rights First, Update: State of Affairs: Four Years After Nisoor Square 
3 (2011), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/State_of_Affairs_Re- 
port_ final.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). 
80 James Risen, Efforts to Prosecute Blackwater Are Collapsing, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 2010, at 
A1. 
81 Id. 
82 See id. 
83 See United States v. Slough (Slough I ), 677 F. Supp. 2d 112, 122–23 (D.D.C. 2009). 
84 See id. at 115, 122–23. 
85 See Sudarsan Raghavan & Thomas E. Ricks, Private Security Puts Diplomats, Military at 
Odds: Contractors in Iraq Fuel Debate, Wash. Post, Sept. 26, 2007, at A1. 
86 See id. 
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1. Gathering Independent Evidence 
 One of the most significant obstacles in criminal prosecutions of 
security contractors for their actions abroad is the difficulty associated 
with gathering evidence.87 The prohibitive costs associated with gather-
ing evidence overseas are compounded when the crime scene is in the 
center of a war zone.88 It is virtually impossible to gather dependable 
physical and forensic evidence in this context.89 Unfortunately, the im-
plications of Slough I serve only to further inhibit the prosecution’s abil-
ity to find reliable untainted evidence.90 If the prosecutor cannot find 
sufficient evidence to support a case that is completely independent of 
immunized statements, the case has a very low likelihood of success.91 
 Slough I amplified this challenge by applying the exclusionary rule 
to any physical evidence derived from the defendants’ immunized 
statements, and without independent basis.92 In that instance, the court 
found that the physical evidence was tainted because the investigators 
who searched Nisur Square for shell casings were guided by the content 
of the protected statements.93 
2. Prosecutors with No Control 
 Another obstacle facing prosecutors in criminal cases against gov-
ernment contractors stems from their lack of control over grants of 
immunity.94 Because the State Department took compelled statements 
from the defendants immediately after the shooting incident, the DOJ 
lost any opportunity to preserve evidence before immunity attached.95 
This situation mirrors the challenges of prosecuting police misconduct, 
where investigators take statements before prosecutors are even in-
volved.96 
 In addition to this lack of control over the initial investigation, 
DOJ Prosecutors face further challenges that stem from State Depart-
                                                                                                                      
87 See McKinnon, supra note 5, at 702. 
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 See Christopher D. Belen, Comment, Reining in Rambo: Prosecuting Crimes Committed by 
American Military Contractors in Iraq, 27 Penn St. Int’l L. Rev. 169, 208–09 (2008). 
91 See Slough I, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 164–65. 
92 See id. 
93 See id. 
94 See McKinnon, supra note 5, at 702. 
95 See id. 
96 See Clymer, supra note 43, at 1328–29. 
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ment policies.97 After the shootings at Nisur Square, then-Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice tasked a panel of experts to review the State 
Department’s private security policies in Iraq.98 The panel made a se-
ries of recommendations, including a new procedure for responding to 
unauthorized weapons discharges.99 In order to decrease response 
time, the panel recommended the creation of a “Go Team” that would 
immediately proceed to the scene of any serious incident.100 The Go 
Team would be responsible for gathering information from contractors 
involved in the incident and preparing a report synthesizing their anal-
ysis.101 
 The DOJ would only receive notification if an “Incident Review 
Board” determines that the use of force was not justified based on the 
contents of the Go Team’s report.102 This procedure effectively ensures 
that by the time the DOJ is involved, all parties connected to the inci-
dent will have already provided immunized statements to the Go 
Team.103 In addition, there is a high likelihood that the Go Team’s in-
vestigation will have been guided by information provided in the 
statements, thereby tainting any findings included in the final report.104 
B. Conflicts of Interest and International Outrage 
 In addition to the legal obstacles associated with protected state-
ments, the State Department’s practice of granting immunity to private 
security contractors has caused a myriad of foreign relations prob-
lems.105 In the case of Blackwater, the State Department engineered and 
executed the initial investigation of the defendants while still relying on 
them for security protection.106 The mere appearance of a conflict of 
interest sparked resentment and weakened the United States’ position 
in Iraq.107 News of the immunity that had been attached to the defen-
                                                                                                                      
97 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Report of the Secretary of State’s Panel on Personal 
Protective Services in Iraq 9 (Oct. 2007), http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/94122.pdf. 
98 Id. at 3. 
99 See id. at 9. 
100 Id. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. at 10. 
103 See U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 97, at 9–10. 
104 See id. 
105 See Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful 
Mercenary Army 9 (2007). 
106 See id. at 28. 
107 See Ned Parker, ‘Wall of Silence’ Protects Security Contractor in Iraq, L.A. Times, Sept. 21, 
2007, at A1. 
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dants’ statements led many Iraqis to believe that the American judicial 
system placed private security contractors above the law.108 The court’s 
2009 dismissal of Slough I compounded this belief and prompted Iraq to 
issue an order ejecting from the country hundreds of private security 
guards linked to Blackwater.109 
 Some have even suggested that the investigation was handled 
poorly in order to purposely undermine any chance at a successful 
prosecution.110 David Farrington, a State Department security agent 
who worked in the U.S. Embassy in Iraq told prosecutors that his col-
leagues collected the compelled statements with the distinct objective 
of immunizing the defendants.111 These harmful speculations effec-
tively show Garrity as a tool for protecting government contractors in-
stead of tool for protecting of Fifth Amendment rights.112 
C. Realizing Justice? 
 Although the Obama administration has vowed to bring the de-
fendants to justice in an effort to repair relations with Iraq, the result of 
the appeal has not guaranteed a successful prosecution.113 Even under 
the nuanced review ordered by the appellate court, it is unclear wheth-
er the government will be able to prove that the compelled statements 
did not taint the prosecution.114 Although the final outcome of Slough 
will still be subjected to the burdens of Garrity v. New Jersey and Kastigar 
v. United States, the government can increase the likelihood of success-
ful prosecutions of security contractors in the future by avoiding the 
challenges those decisions continue to present.115 
 One possible solution for escaping the complications associated 
with compelled statements is to avoid taking them entirely.116 The State 
Department’s 2007 recommendations were independently formulated 
without adequate consideration for the DOJ’s interest in a prosecution 
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free from tainted statements.117 To understand and address the legal 
implications of immunity, the State Department should work with the 
DOJ to establish a uniform system for investigating serious incidents 
involving contractors.118 The DOJ could be granted immediate jurisdic-
tion in all cases involving criminal matters instead of waiting for agen-
cies to conduct preliminary findings.119 This would allow prosecutors to 
preserve evidence and weigh the legal implications before deciding to 
grant immunity, in addition to avoiding apparent investigative conflicts 
of interest.120 
 An alternative approach would be to permit the State Department 
to elicit statements from security contractors without using the threat of 
job loss to encourage cooperation.121 Garrity immunity only attaches in 
cases where an individual is faced with such pressure that he is disabled 
from making a free choice.122 Using sanctions that are less severe than 
the threat of job loss to question contractors would not rise to a level of 
unacceptable coercion.123 Although this could potentially deprive the 
investigators of some initial information, it would also encourage the 
State Department to explore other sources of evidence to compen-
sate.124 This process would allow the State Department to initiate an 
investigation without triggering Garrity immunity and foreclosing the 
chance of a subsequent criminal prosecution before the DOJ becomes 
involved.125 
Conclusion 
 United States v. Slough has highlighted the legal challenges attached 
to compelled statements and the government’s inability to effectively 
prosecute private security contractors who commit crimes abroad. 
Compelled statements have frustrated cases involving allegations of po-
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lice misconduct since the Supreme Court changed the scope of federal 
immunity in Garrity v. New Jersey and Kastigar v. United States. Prosecutors 
who have no control over grants of immunity are forced to fight uphill 
battles to overcome the evidentiary complications that stem from pro-
tected statements. Despite the problems associated with the system for 
handling allegations of police misconduct, the method for dealing with 
allegations of security contractor misconduct has fallen into a similarly 
dysfunctional pattern. 
 The practice of taking compelled statements that are protected by 
immunity before prosecutors are involved with investigations creates 
serious legal obstacles that effectively shield contractors from criminal 
penalties. By adopting new procedures that immediately involve the 
DOJ in investigations of contractor misconduct, the State Department 
can avoid the complications associated with compelled statements un-
der Garrity and Kastigar. Until then, the DOJ’s inability to hold private 
security contractors accountable will continue to strain the tenuous re-
lationship between the United States and Iraq. 
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